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New Bank Start-Ups:
Entrepreneurs Funding Other Entrepreneurs

Robert DeYoung*
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

There has traditionally been a symbiotic link between new business ventures and new banking
ventures. This article finds that the traditional link between small businesses and small banks –
the small business loan – has weakened in recent years. While new banks have intensified their
reliance on small business customers, small business borrowers have become less reliant on
small banks for their credit needs. These findings are consistent with rapid changes in the
structure of the banking industry, financial instruments and markets, and communications and
information technology over the past two decades.
Introduction
Entrepreneurs running small businesses, and especially entrepreneurs starting up a new
business, have limited financing options. The cornerstone financing, equity capital, typically
comes from the personal savings of the entrepreneur that organized and manages the firm, or
from outside investors who know the entrepreneur. As time passes, however, successful
business start-ups become increasingly able to complement their equity capital with debt. For
most small business start-ups, the primary provider of this debt financing is a small, locally
based, community bank.
Community banks have traditionally been well-suited to evaluate the risks of lending to
small businesses. Because of its local geographic focus, the typical community bank has at least
two potential advantages over large banks headquartered outside of the local market. First, the
very nature of its daily business – monitoring local business loans, talking with local government
officials, observing activity in the checking accounts of local businesses and consumers – keeps
the community bank in continuous contact with a web of local economic players, and provides
the community bank with a storehouse of knowledge in real time about local business conditions
*
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and prospects. Second, by virtue of its business strategy, a community bank has a financial stake
in the local community, which creates an incentive to build long-lasting relationships with its
local clients. When a community bank makes a loan to a small local business, it leverages its
stock of information about the local economy during the underwriting process; it adds to that
stock of information as it monitors the activity of these borrowers; and it establishes a
relationship with a client which may purchase additional financial services from the bank in the
future.
Two broad sets of forces are threatening to erode community banks‟ traditional
advantages at small business lending. First, recent advances in financial, information, and
communications technologies are allowing large banks, thrifts, and finance companies with little
specialized knowledge of the local economy to profitably underwrite loans to small businesses.
Essentially, these lenders are substituting information technology for local information: they can
use the Internet to inexpensively generate loan applications; they can evaluate those applications
using credit scoring models; and they are large enough to diversify away idiosyncratic credit risk
by making large numbers of loans in many different geographic markets. Second, deregulation
of the banking industry has allowed large out-of-state banks to physically enter any local market
in the country, typically by acquiring a local bank. Being “on the ground” in the local market
arguably gives these large, out-of-state banks access to the same local information as the
community banks.
But not all large acquisitive banks choose to compete head-to-head with local banks for
small business customers. It is not unusual for large bank entrants to de-emphasize the small
business part of the banks they acquire – either not renewing these loans or unfavorably altering
the terms of these loans – in favor of using the acquired bank mainly as a retail outlet. These
small businesses are left to search for new credit relationships, and this has been an important
factor driving the increase in new bank start-ups in the U.S. since the mid-1990s. These new
start-up banks are too small to make large loans, and they are typically run by refugee officers
from acquired banks whose comparative advantage is their knowledge of the local business
environment. Hence, out of necessity, new start-up banks are typically launched with small
business lending strategies.
The relationship between small banks and small businesses – and especially between new
bank start-ups and new businesses start-ups – can be characterized as symbiotic. But this
symbiosis may be sensitive to advances in information processing and financial technologies.
This article analyzes data on small business lending between 1993 and 2001, and finds evidence
that the nature of the symbiotic credit link between new banks and small businesses has
deteriorated in recent years. Both new banks and small banks have grown more reliant on small
business clients, but small business borrowers have become less reliant on these banks for their
credit needs. These findings are consistent with the evolving structure of the banking industry,
the development of new financial instruments and markets, and advances in communications and
information technology over the past two decades.
I. The Symbiotic Relationship Between Business Ventures and Banking Ventures
This section provides some expanded background information on the symbiotic lending
relationships discussed above. Section I.A summarizes the findings of Berger and Udell (1998)
on the financing mix at small businesses. Section I.B reviews the reasons that community banks
tend to focus on small business lending. Section I.C discusses the entry strategies of newly
chartered commercial banks.
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I.A Financing new business start-ups
Small businesses in the U.S. receive a substantial part of their financing from commercial
bank loans, and this credit is especially important for new businesses that survive beyond their
first two years of operation. Using data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business
Finance, which defines a small business as an enterprise with less than 500 full-time employees,
Berger and Udell (1998) showed that three distinctly different sources accounted for threequarters of the financing at the typical U.S. small business. The primary owners of the firm
provided about 35% of funding, mostly in the form of equity ownership (about 31%) with a
small portion coming from personal loans and credit card debt. Loans from financial institutions
provided about 25% of funding, mostly from commercial banks (about 19%). Suppliers
provided about 16% of funding through trade credits.
The financing mix at small businesses tends to vary with both the size of the firm and
with the age of the firm. On average, very small firms (those with less than 20 FTEs and less
than $1 million in annual sales) relied more heavily on insider funds, receiving 51% of their
funding from their primary owners, compared to only 21% from financial institutions and 12%
from trade credit. Small businesses above this size threshold used relatively more outsider
funding, receiving only 31% of their funding from their primary owners, but 28% from financial
institutions and 17% from trade credit.
These size-based differences in financing mix are consistent with the life cycle of small
businesses. As a new business grows older it also tends to grow larger. Because older, larger
businesses are less informationally opaque they are better credit risks than younger, smaller
businesses, and as a result they are better able to secure financing from third parties. Older and
larger firms make more frequent transactions with an expanded set of venders and customers;
they have longer and more complete financial track records; and the very fact that they did not
fail early in their lives suggests that they are (relatively) good risks to survive into the future.
Having access to debt financing through bank loans or trade credit makes it easier for owners to
grow their firms without having sell a portion of their equity stakes.
Bank loans are especially important as new businesses mature from their infancy through
their adolescence. Commercial bank loans comprised only about 16% of total financing for
small firms that were less than 2 years old; 31% for small firms that were between 2 and 4 years
old; and 18% for small firms that were more than 4 years old. The increase in loans up to year 4
is consistent with reduced informational opaqueness as new firms grow older. The decline in
loans after year 4 suggests that successful business start-ups are able to reduce their financial
leverage (and their financial risk) as they mature. Less than half of all new businesses survive
beyond their fourth year – those that survive beyond that are likely to be profitable firms with
lots of retained earnings, which can be used to reduce debt financing.
I.B Small business lending at community banks
The typical small business is closely held, does not issue publicly traded securities, and
tends to do business with a limited number of suppliers and customers. As a result, the financial
information needed to make and monitor a small business loan must be gleaned from a first hand
relationship with that firm. Community banks have a number of comparative advantages over
larger banks at forming these relationships, and this is reflected on community bank balance
sheets where a disproportionate amount of commercial loans are made to small businesses.
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Community banks tend to have a very tight geographic focus. Although this limits
opportunities for diversification and growth, this localness has advantages for small business
lending. Community banks gather most of their deposits locally and make most of their loans to
local borrowers, so they benefit from informational synergies – that is, they acquire substantial
amounts of useful information simply because their local business and retail customers make
transactions with each other. In addition, community banks can monitor their business loans
more frequently because they are located relatively close to their customers. Finally, the
decentralized organizational structure of the typical community bank encourages relationships to
grow between loan officers and small business clients; in contrast, large banks with extensive
branching networks often used a centralized decision-making process, and branch managers are
frequently rotated from branch to branch.
Government regulations reinforce community banks‟ informational, locational, and
organizational advantages at making small business loans. Federal bank regulators have
historically prevented national banks from extending unsecured loans to individual business
borrowers in amounts that exceed 15% of bank capital.1 To make a $1 million business loan (the
largest loan recognized by regulators as a small business loan) to a single borrower, a community
bank with a fairly typical 8% ratio of equity capital-to-assets would have to have total assets of at
least $83 million. This is a binding threshold for new start-up banks. Furthermore, this
regulation precludes most established community banks from making loans to large business
customers: for example, a bank has to have over $400 million of assets to make a single loan of
$5 million.
Community banks can avoid loan concentration limits simply by growing larger. A
number of studies find strong negative relationships between bank size and the proportion of
bank assets invested in small business loans.2 The quickest way for a community bank to grow
is to acquire another community bank. Note, however, that small business lending does not
always decline after two banks merge. These studies find that small business lending is unlikely
to decline when both merger partners are small banks, and regardless of bank size, small
business lending is unlikely to decline when it is an important part of the acquiring bank‟s premerger business strategy.
I.C Small business lending at start-up banks
Over the past forty years there have been three major surges in bank chartering activity in
the U.S. The first wave came in the early 1970s, a second wave followed in the mid-1980s, and
a third wave occurred in the late-1990s. At their peaks, each of these „de novo‟ bank waves was
increasing the population of commercial banks by about 2.5% per year (DeYoung 1999).
The timing of the waves coincided with changes in economic conditions, financial
regulations, and industry structure over time. For example, the second and third waves
correspond roughly with economic expansions, and the trough that separates them corresponds
roughly with the banking crisis of the late-1980s and a macroeconomic recession in the early
1990s. In addition, the second and third waves correspond roughly with the deregulation of
1

State regulatory authorities have similar restrictions in place for state-chartered banks. In 2001 the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency relaxed the 15% loan concentration guideline somewhat for small, financially sound
national banks.
2
These studies include Nakamura (1993), Keeton (1995), Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), Levonian and Soller
(1995), Berger and Udell (1996), Peek and Rosengren (1996), Strahan and Weston (1998), and DeYoung, Goldberg,
and White (2000).
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interstate banking: a large number of state governments repealed unit banking laws and formed
interstate banking compacts during the 1980s, and in the mid-1990s the federal government
passed and implemented the Riegle-Neal Act which allowed banks to branch across state lines
anywhere in the country. These deregulations resulted in thousands of geographic-expansion
mergers in which large banking companies acquired smaller, more locally focused banks in other
states.
As alluded to above in Section 1, geographic-expansion mergers can be good predictors
of new bank start-ups. Berger, Goldberg, and White (2001) and Keeton (2000) both find
systematic evidence that new banks are significantly more likely to start up in local markets that
have recently experienced entry by acquisition. It is not unusual for an acquiring bank to
institute changes in lending policies at the bank it acquires, or to institute cost-cutting programs
to improve the performance of the target bank. It is also not unusual for loan officers at the
acquired local bank (who have specialized knowledge of the local business community) to
become unhappy with the new lending policy, for these lending officers to get terminated as part
of the cost-cutting program, or for the clients of the acquired bank to become disenchanted.
Under these circumstances it is relatively easy for new start-up banks to enter the market,
because loan officers with valuable connections to the local business community are available
for hire, and profitable small business accounts are looking to switch to a new bank. Hence, new
banks often enter the market with ready-made connections with small business clients, and as a
result their initial loan portfolios are more heavily weighted toward small business loans than at
established community banks.
The magnitude of this effect was illustrated in a study by DeYoung (1998), who
examined the lending behavior of relatively young U.S. commercial banks during the mid-1990s.
Figure 1 is constructed using data from the original study. For the typical 1-year old commercial
bank, the ratio of small business loans to total loans was about 27%, while at small established
banks this ratio was only about 13.5%. These data indicate a relatively long-lasting difference,
not just a short-run entry strategy. As late as 14 years after start-up, the intensity of small
business lending at the average start-up bank was still 50% higher than at the typical small
established bank. DeYoung (1998) and DeYoung, Goldberg, and White (1999) ran more
rigorous tests of the data in Figure 1 that carefully accounted for the effects of bank age, bank
size, and other determinants of lending strategies. Both studies confirmed the basic result – as in
the raw data, the intensity of small business lending at de novo banks starts out high, and
decreases very slowly over time as these new banks mature.
II. A Changing Environment for Lending to Small Businesses
This section provides a brief analysis of ongoing changes in the banking industry that are
likely to affect the relationships between banks and small business customers, and by extension
the supply of credit to small businesses. These changes affect the geographic structure of the
banking industry, the competitive conditions faced by banks, the information and
communications technologies used by banks, and the business strategies used by banks. The
discussion draws in part on earlier analysis by DeYoung (2000), Hunter (2001), and DeYoung
and Hunter (2001).
II.A Geographic change
The repeal of federal and state restrictions on interstate banking eliminated the barriers to
geographic mobility which had artificially limited the size of U.S. banking companies. Although
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geographic expansion has proceeded more slowly than many had predicted (for example, as of
2002 there is still no truly „nationwide‟ retail bank in the U.S.), many banks have grown
substantially larger in a relatively short period of time by acquiring other banks.
The most visible bank mergers are „megamergers‟ between two large and well-known
institutions. In 1998 alone, Bank of America merged with NationsBank to create a $580 billion
bank; Banc One merged with First Chicago to create a $231 billion bank; and Wells Fargo
merged with Norwest to create a $190 billion bank. But megamergers are the exception to the
rule: approximately 95 percent of the nearly 9,000 mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. banks
since 1980 have involved at least one community bank. As a result, the number of large banks
has remained relatively constant in the U.S., but the number of small community banks (less than
$500 million in assets) has declined by nearly 50 percent.
Mergers have had two profound effects on behavior within banks. First, increasing the
geographic reach of banking company can make it more difficult to manage. Berger and
DeYoung (2001) show that the average distance between commercial bank affiliates with at least
$100 million in assets and their holding company headquarters increased from about 160 miles in
1985 to about 290 miles in 1998. Moreover, their findings suggest that the increased distances
between bank affiliates and their headquarters managers are associated with internal control
problems. Solutions to these control problems – like imposing strong, centralized management
structures – may hinder the ability of lending officers at the local affiliates of large banks to
develop relationships with small business borrowers. Second, mergers have intensified
competition in local markets. A number of recent studies conclude that local banks tend to
operate at higher levels of efficiency after one of their local competitors is acquired by an out-ofmarket bank.3 There are a number of potential explanations for this phenomenon. After the new
owners take over, they often replace underperforming managers, reallocate assets to higher
yielding investments, slash expenses, introduce new products and services, cut fees, raise deposit
rates, or make numerous other changes that increase competitive rivalry in the local market.
Local banks either respond in kind or lose market share to the new entrant.
II.B Technological change
Banks also face increased competition from a variety of relatively new non-banking
institutions. For example, mutual funds have provided bank depositors with an array of
alternative vehicles for savings and liquidity. Similarly, the commercial paper market has
provided new financing options for banks‟ most creditworthy customers, and the junk bond
market has provided new financing options for banks‟ riskier customers.
Faced with losing market share in their traditional lines of business, banks have
responded with new business strategies based on new financial technologies. Banks have
learned how to use their increasingly scarce funds more efficiently by securitizing their loans
rather than holding them in portfolio. Banks have continued to earn revenues from business
clients who switch from bank loans to commercial paper financing by selling them back-up lines
of credit. And banks have made themselves relatively more attractive to depositors by offering
the increased convenience of ATM machines, Internet banking, and access to a broader array of
third-party mutual funds.
To a large degree, these competitive responses have shifted the composition of bank
revenue away from interest income and toward noninterest income. A securitized lending
3

See DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff (1998), Evanoff and Ors (2001), and Whalen (2001).
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strategy generates little interest income because the loans are not held for long on the books, but
it generates increased noninterest income (e.g., loan origination fees) because the volume of
loans that are underwritten typically increases. Similarly, back-up lines of credit generate fee
income, as do ATM networks from third-party access fees. These competitive responses are
more pronounced at large banks, which have the capacity to originate large volumes of
securitizable loans (e.g., mortgage loans, credit card loans) and the investment capital necessary
to deploy widespread ATM networks.
Given their small size and local clientele, community banks are less able and/or less
willing to embrace these new banking technologies. But the adoption of these new technologies
by large banks may provide some opportunities for community banks. For example, the
idiosyncratic nature of small business lending relationships is in many ways inconsistent with
automated lending technologies. As a result, shifts in large bank strategies toward credit scoring
and securitization may increase small community banks‟ advantages at traditional relationshipbased lending.
II.C Strategic change
DeYoung (2000) and DeYoung and Hunter (2001) use a strategic map like the one shown
in Figure 2 to analyze the past two decades of change in the banking industry. The unit costs of
producing banking services is measured vertically, and the degree to which banks differentiate
the (actual or perceived) quality of their products and services is measured horizontally. The
circles represent individual banks: the circle positions indicate the combination of unit costs and
product differentiation selected by the banks, and the circle sizes indicate bank size.
Prior to industry deregulation, both large banks and small banks were clustered together
near the northeast corner of the strategy space. Large banks tended to have larger commercial
accounts than small banks, but the differences in bank size weren‟t so much a strategic choice as
a reflection of the size of the local market and the restrictiveness of local branching rules. Small
banks tended to offer more person-to-person service than large banks, but this wasn‟t so much a
strategic choice as a reflection of the difficulty of delivering high-touch personal service as an
organization grows larger.
Deregulation and new financial technologies created incentives for large banks to become
less like small banks. Banks used mergers to get larger, capturing economies of scale that drove
down their unit costs and gave them access to the new production and distribution technologies.
These changes drove a „strategic wedge‟ between the large growing banks on one hand and the
smaller community banks on the other hand. Large banks moved in a southwest direction on the
map, sacrificing personalized service in exchange for large scale production of standardized
financial products at low unit costs. Most community banks have remained relatively small and
continued to operate at high unit costs, but their more personalized approach to financial services
(e.g., small business lending) allows them to charge higher prices that offset their cost
disadvantages.
III. Empirical analysis
This section presents new evidence that the symbiotic relationship historically enjoyed by
new bank start-ups and small businesses has weakened in recent years. Section III.A presents
the empirical model. Section III.B describes the data. Section III.C presents the test results.
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III.A Empirical model
The tests performed here extend the analysis of DeYoung, Goldberg, and White (1999)
on the small business lending behavior of newly chartered commercial banks. Equation (1) is a
variant of the main regression equation estimated in that study:
SBL/ASSETSi,t = 

+ *AGEi,t + *AGEi,t*POST94i + *ASSETSi,t
+ *ASSETSi,t*POST94i + *POST94i
+ 1*LOANS/ASSETSi,t + 2*ASSETGROWTHi,t
+ 3*MBHCi,t + 4*YEAR1MBHCi + 5*HERFINDAHLi,t
+ 6*YEAR DUMMIESt + i,t
(1)

where the subscripts i and t are indexes for banks and time, respectively. The dependent variable
SBL/ASSETS is the ratio of small business loans-to-total bank assets. As discussed above,
previous research indicates that small business lending at newly chartered banks tends to decline
as new banks mature (AGE) and also tends to decline as new banks get larger (ASSETS). The
dummy variable POST94 is included to test whether these age and size effects were different for
the generation of new bank start-ups chartered after 1994, described above in Section 2 as the
“third wave” of de novo banks. These banks began their lives in an environment where new
technology, deregulated markets, and intensified competition may have eroded the symbiotic
relationship between new banks and small businesses.
The remainder of the right-hand-side variables are included as controls. The coefficient
on the ratio of loans-to-assets (LOANS/ASSETS) is expected to be positive, because when a new
bank expands its investment in loans (as opposed to its investments in securities), a substantial
portion of these loans are likely to be small business loans. Similarly, the coefficient on annual
asset growth (ASSETGROWTH) is expected to be positive. The coefficient on the multibank
holding company dummy (MBHC) is expected to be negative, because banks that are affiliates in
large multibank organizations are less likely than independent banks to make small business
relationship loans. Similarly, banks that began their lives as affiliates in multibank holding
companies (as opposed to becoming affiliates via acquisition later on) are expected to make
fewer small business loans. The coefficient on local market concentration (HERFINDAHL) is
expected to be negative, based on the Petersen and Rajan (1995) finding that banks are more
likely to invest in a new loan relationship when the probability of the borrower switching to a
different bank in the future is low. The equation also includes a vector of fixed effect YEAR
dummies to control for the effects of general economic conditions on small business lending.
Alternative versions of equation (1) are estimated using slightly different definitions for
two of the regression variables. The dependent variable SBL/ASSETS is replaced by the ratio of
small business loans-to-total loans (SBL/LOANS) in some regressions, and the dummy variable
POST94 is replaced by the dummy variable POST89 in other regressions. All regressions are
estimated using ordinary least squares.
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III.B Data
The data used in this study come from the Statements of Condition and Income (the call
reports). Starting in 1993, the call reports began to include data on the number and volume of
small business loans made by all commercial banks. The call reports include several alternative
definitions for small business loans – this study defines a small business loan (SBL) as a
commercial and industrial loan with an original principal of less than $1 million. Using this
definition, the call reports indicate that there has been a striking change in the distribution of
small business lending across different sizes of commercial banks since 1993. In 1993, about
63% of all small business loans were held by banks with less than $10 billion in assets. By 2001,
about 60% of all small business loans were held by banks with greater than $10 billion in assets.
(These figures exclude loans held by rural banks, and are corrected for inflation.) This simple
comparison may be evidence that the comparative advantage of community banks in gathering
information on small business borrowers has eroded over time, and that larger banks have been
able to use their access to new information technologies to increase their market share of small
business loans.
Although increasing numbers of small business borrowers were turning to large banks for
credit, small banks were becoming more reliant on small business loan customers. In 1993, the
average values of SBL/ASSETS and SBL/LOANS for banks with under $500 million in assets
were, respectively, about 6% and 10%. By 2001, these percentages had increased to about 10%
and 15%, respectively. (The comparable percentages for banks with over $10 billion in assets
remained relatively flat over this time period, at about 3% and 5%, respectively.)
The factor that reconciles these two phenomena is the declining number of small banks.
Between 1993 and 2001, the number of small community banks (i.e., banks with less than $500
million in assets) in the U.S. declined by one-third, from almost 7,500 banks to around 5,000
banks.
Equation (1) is estimated using an unbalanced panel of annual data drawn from the call
reports between 1993 and 2001. To be included in this data panel, a bank had to be located in a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), had to be between 1 and 20-years old, had to have positive
amounts of loans and assets, and complete data for all of the regression variables had to be
available for the bank. All variables are observed as of the end of the second quarter, and are
expressed in 2001 dollars. The panel contains 13,424 annual observations, and is an unbalanced
panel because: (a) many new banks started up during the sample period, and (b) many banks
exited the data set by failing, being acquired, or reaching the age of 21. Table I shows summary
statistics for the data set used in the regression tests.
III.C Regression results
Table II displays the regression estimates. There is significant evidence that the
relationship between start-up banks and small business borrowers has evolved with recent
changes in the banking environment. Consistent with the findings of DeYoung, Goldberg, and
White (1999), the coefficient on AGE is negative and significant in all four regressions, evidence
that small business lending gradually declines in importance for newly chartered banks as they
mature. For the new banks in the entire sample – which were chartered anywhere between the
years 1973 and 2000 – the ratio of small business loans-to-assets declines by about 10 basis
points, and the ratio of small business loans-to-total loans declines by about 20 basis points,
when the average bank grows one year older.
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However, there is clear evidence that small business lending declined even more rapidly
with age for new banks chartered during the 1990s. The coefficients on the AGE*POST
interaction variables are generally negative and significant. SBL/ASSETS fell about twice as
fast with bank age (for example,
-.0014 plus -.0011 in regression [2]), and SBL/LOANS fell about three times as fast with bank
age (for example, -.0018 plus -.0036 in regression [3]) for banks chartered in the 1990s.
Furthermore, the positive and significant coefficients on the POST dummy variables indicate that
small business lending has become a more important entry strategy for banks chartered during
the 1990s. Setting AGE=0 and POST94=1 in regressions [1] and [3] shows that the typical new
bank chartered after 1994 started out with 187 basis points higher SBL/ASSETS, and 474 basis
points higher SBL/LOANS, than the typical new bank chartered before 1995. This effect is
similar, though less dramatic, in regressions [2] and [4] for POST89.
The coefficients on ASSETS and ASSETS*POST reveal similar patterns for the
relationship between small business lending and bank size. Consistent with previous research
findings, small business lending declines at the average new bank in the sample as it gets larger;
for example, in regression [1] the coefficient on ASSETS indicates that SBL/ASSETS declines
by about 50 basis points when the assets of the average bank grow by $1 million. But for new
banks chartered after 1994, the coefficient on ASSETS*POST94 indicates that the size-based
decline in small business lending is five times faster (that is, -.0248 versus -.0049).
IV. Conclusions
The analysis performed here suggests that small business lending has become a more
important entry strategy for new banks that started up during the 1990s. This is likely a
reflection of the massive consolidation and restructuring of the banking industry during the past
decade, and the opportunities that this has created for new entry – i.e., the displacement of small
depositors, small business credit relationships, and small bank credit officers in the aftermath of
geographic-expansion mergers. Put simply, small business lending became an easier entry
strategy for new banks during the 1990s as the ready supplies of these three crucial inputs
increased.
The analysis also suggests that new banks that started up during the 1990s moved away
from their small business lending strategies more quickly than start-up banks in the past. This is
likely because deregulation (which increased banks‟ abilities to expand geographically) and new
banking and information technologies (e.g., Internet banking, credit scoring) have allowed banks
of all sizes to grow faster. As new bank start-ups grow faster, they can more quickly escape the
constraints that had previously limited their commercial lending opportunities to small firms.
Against this backdrop, it is instructive that large banks have substantially increased their
market share of small business loans over the past decade, while the market share held by
community banks has substantially decreased. This suggests that community banks‟ traditional
comparative advantage at gathering information from small local businesses is eroding, at least
to some extent because of large banks‟ use of new information technologies and financial
techniques.
Considering all of this evidence together suggests that the traditional symbiotic
relationship between new banking ventures and small business ventures is weakening. New
banking ventures are depending more on small business loans as an entry vehicle, but are
abandoning their small business strategies earlier in their lives. On the other side of the
relationship, small business borrowers are depending more on large banks for credit.
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TABLE I
Summary Statistics. Data is an unbalanced panel of 13,424 annual observations of U.S.
commercial banks during the 1993 through 2001 time period. For an annual observation to be
included in the data set, the bank had to be located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), had
to be between 1 and 20-years old, had to have positive amounts of loans and assets, and complete
data for all of the regression variables had to be available. All variables are observed as of the
end of the second quarter, and are expressed in 2001 dollars. SBL = commercial and industrial
loans with original principal less than $1 million. ASSETS = total bank assets. LOANS = total
loans and leases. (Note: LOANS/ASSETS can be greater than 1.0 because LOANS is measured
prior to deductions for expected loan losses.) AGE = bank age in years (e.g., AGE = 1 for banks
that are between 6 and 18 months old). ASSETGROWTH = percent change in ASSETS from
year earlier levels. (Note: The values of ASSETGROWTH are truncated at the 0.5th and 99.5th
percentiles of the sample distribution.) MBHC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is an
affiliate in a multibank holding company in the year of observation. MBHCYEAR1 is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the bank began its life as an affiliate of a multibank holding company.
HERFINDAHL = the deposit-based Herfindahl index in the bank‟s home MSA. YEAR93
through YEAR01 are dummy variables equal to 1 for observations from the years 1993 through
2001, respectively.

SBL/ASSETS
SBL/LOANS
AGE (in years)
ASSETS ($ millions)
LOANS/ASSETS
ASSETGROWTH
MBHC
MBHCYEAR1
HERFINDAHL
YEAR93
YEAR94
YEAR95
YEAR96
YEAR97
YEAR98
YEAR99
YEAR00
YEAR01

mean

std. dev.

minimum

maximum

.1022
.1653
9.56
$325.76
.6164
.2022
.2186
.0114
.1128
.1383
.1249
.1133
.1056
.1021
.1025
.1015
.1053
.1066

.0913
.1435
5.45
$1,707.13
.1572
.4021
.4133
.1062
.0504
.3452
.3306
.3170
.3074
.3027
.3033
.3019
.3070
.3086

0.0000
0.0000
1
$2.12
.0001
-.2900
0
0
.0247
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

.6938
1.0000
20
$49,093.71
1.0369
2.4600
1
1
.3514
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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TABLE II
OLS Estimates of Equation (1). Data is an unbalanced panel of 13,424 annual observations of
U.S. commercial banks during the 1993 through 2001 time period. POST89 and POST94 are
dummy variables equal to one for banks that were chartered after 1989 and 1994, respectively.
All other variables are defined in Table I. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the estimated
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The
standard errors of the coefficient estimates appear in parentheses. (Note: The estimated
coefficients for the YEAR fixed effects variables are suppressed.)
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

dependent variable:

SBL/Assets

SBL/Assets

SBL/Loans

SBL/Loans

INTERCEPT

.0396***
(.0052)
-.0010***
(.0002)
.0019
(.0014)
---.0049***
(.0004)
-.0248***
(.0030)
--.0187***
(.0046)
--.1352***
(.0048)
.0023
(.0020)
-.0205***
(.0019)
-.0066
(.0076)
-.0339**
(.0150)

.0520***
(.0056)
-.0014***
(.0002)
---.0011*
(.0006)
-.0044***
(.0005)
---.0052***
(.0011)
--.0097**
(.0041)
.1328***
(.0048)
.0029
(.0020)
-.0218***
(.0019)
-.0095
(.0075)
-.0294**
(.0151)

.1954***
(.0084)
-.0018***
(.0003)
-.0036*
(.0020)
---.0068***
(.0007)
-.0325***
(.0048)
--.0474***
(.0075)
--.0077
(.0078)
-.0008
(.0032)
-.0364***
(.0030)
-.0183
(.0122)
-.0683***
(.0243)

.2126***
(.0090)
-.0023***
(.0004)
---.0037***
(.0009)
-.0058***
(.0008)
---.0083***
(.0018)
--.0257***
(.0066)
.0031
(.0078)
.0001
(.0032)
-.0384***
(.0030)
-.0183
(.0120)
-.0601**
(.0244)

.1205

.1152

.0666

.0629

AGE
AGE*POST94
AGE*POST89
ASSETS
ASSETS*POST94
ASSETS*POST89
POST94
POST89
LOANS/ASSETS
ASSETGROWTH
MBHC
MBHCYEAR1
HERFINDAHL

R-square

75

Figure 1
Percentage of Loans made to Small Businesses (%SBL)
at Small Urban Commercial Banks, 1994-1996.
Source: DeYoung (1999).
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SOURCE: Reprinted from the Journal of Banking and Finance, volume 23, Robert DeYoung,
Lawrence G. Goldberg, and Lawrence J. White, “Youth, Adolescence, and Maturity of Banks:
Credit Availability to Small Business in an Era of Banking Consolidation,” pages 463-492,
Copyright (1999), with permission form Elsevier Science.
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Figure 2
Strategic Map of the Banking Industry.
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SOURCE: DeYoung, Robert, and William C. Hunter, “Deregulation, the Internet, and the
Competitive Viability of Large Banks and Community Banks,” in The Future of Banking, pp.
173-202, ed. Benton Gup, Westport, CT: Quoram Books, 2003.

